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I - Introduction 
 
Prior to 2007, there was no s61HA of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). At that time, to 
successfully convict an accused for sexual assault, the prosecution had to establish three 
things beyond reasonable doubt. First, that sexual intercourse had taken place; second, that 
the complainant did not consent to that sexual intercourse; and third, a mens rea or 
‘knowledge’ requirement. To discharge their onus regarding this last limb, the prosecution 
had to prove that the defendant either knew the complainant was not consenting or was 
reckless as to consent. 
 
The result was that, at least in theory, a defendant who could establish a subjective belief that 
a sexual partner was consenting would be acquitted, no matter how unreasonable that belief. 
The defendant, you could say, lived or died on his or her own subjective mental state: their 
culpability was tied almost entirely to their consciousness of guilt. As a result, those who 
endured non-consensual sex with a person who had an honest but unreasonable belief that the 
sex was consensual were left without recourse in the criminal law for the harm done to them. 
Some might say that their ‘right’ to see their assailants punished was not protected by the 
criminal law. 
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In this article, we consider the legislative attempt at closing this gap in the form of the Crimes 
Amendment (Consent – Sexual Assault) Offences Act 2007 (NSW), which added the new 
s61HA and, with it, an objective approach to the requisite mens rea. We contrast this solution 
with our own alternative model based in tort law, which, while suffering from its own 
problems, provides a useful theoretical contrast to the approach taken by the legislature. 
 
In imposing an objective mens rea requirement for sexual assault, the legislature has 
attempted to solve complex and important problems within the existing state of the law. 
However, by advancing the reforms as part of a progressive or feminist-inspired movement 
toward justice for victims, they have placed the reforms at the heart of controversial terrain. 
The result may be that critiques of the reform appear unsympathetic to those who have 
endured sexual assault. Yet this should not circumscribe a full and frank analysis of the 
implications of the reform. If reforms, motivated by admirable aims, fail to achieve 
substantive justice, they should not be fully endorsed, even by authors who would otherwise 
be sympathetic to such theoretical or political positions (such as the authors of this article).  
 
Our thesis is that approaching reform of the criminal law with a primary preoccupation with 
the harm suffered by a victim will inevitably cause controversy and dissatisfaction. This is 
because the criminal law has traditionally focused on the guilt or innocence of an accused. 
Our alternative model, utilising tort law, does not require reform of the law because it relies 
on the legal distinction, inherent in the criminal and civil systems, between tort law’s focus 
on the victim and criminal law’s focus on the accused. In any event, as we shall endeavour to 
demonstrate, by creating an objective mens rea standard for sexual assault, the reforms may 
have unwittingly cemented the position of the actions of the victim at the heart of the jury’s 
investigation, resulting in outcomes that reinforce rather than alter unjustified claims that 
sexual assault occurs because of the actions of victims. 
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II - The 2007 Amendments 
  
In 2007, the Crimes Amendment (Consent – Sexual Assault) Offences Act 2007 (NSW) 
amended the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) to add a new s61HA. This section performs a number 
of functions relating to the offence of sexual assault.1 This article shall only discuss 
s61HA(3)(c) and its introduction of an objective mens rea for sexual assault. 
  
Where a defendant now claims that he or she thought their sexual partner was consenting, a 
jury will be asked to determine whether they had reasonable grounds for that belief. If the 
jury finds they had no reasonable grounds, the defendant will be treated as if they knew the 
complainant was not consenting. The subsection thereby augments the mens rea for sexual 
assault to catch those aforementioned defendants who held an honest but unreasonable belief 
that a sexual partner was consenting to sexual intercourse. The practical effect is that those 
who have sexual intercourse with another person, believing that they are consenting, may 
nonetheless be liable for sexual assault charges. 
  
The section works through something of a legal artifice: imposing on a defendant an artificial 
state of knowledge in response to the unreasonableness of their real state of mind. This mens 
rea requirement is thus ‘objective’ since it discards the subjective mind state of the defendant 
for an inquiry into whether a person such as the defendant, sharing the defendant’s belief, 
would hold their belief on reasonable grounds. 
  
In determining whether the defendant had reasonable grounds, juries are to have regard to all 
the circumstances of the case and particularly any steps that the defendant took to ascertain 
whether the complainant was consenting.2 An appellate court has yet to interpret the effect of 
this new section and there remain significant questions as to its proper operation.3 
                                                                        
1
 For a detailed overview, see Ian Dobinson and Lesley Townsley, ‘Sexual Assault Law Reform in NSW: Issues 
of Consent and Objective Fault’ (2008) 32 Criminal Law Journal 152. 
2
 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HA(3)(d). Juries may not, however, have regard to the self-induced intoxication of 
the defendant: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HA(3)(e). 
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It is clear from the Bill’s second reading speech that the reforms had a number of aims. First, 
the reforms sought to address the 70 recommendations of a report by the Criminal Justice 
Sexual Offences Task Force, as well as concerns raised by providers of women’s legal 
services, rape crisis services and more collectively those representing women’s interests. 
Secondly, the new law was to play a socially educative role – encouraging active 
ascertainment of consent before sexual intercourse and helping to bring about a cultural 
change in the investigation and prosecution of sexual assault. Thirdly, the reforms aimed to 
introduce community standards into determining the culpability of defendants in sexual 
assault trials. Fourthly, they were to help ‘alleviate the high rates of attrition in sexual 
offence’ trials and address low conviction rates for sexual assault. Last, the Attorney-General 
referred to simplifying the criminal trial process for juries, by allowing them to employ their 
common sense to determine liability.4 
  
Many of these aims are admirable, particularly the stated aim of attempting to address low 
conviction rates for sexual assault and we do not suggest that the law as it stood before the 
reform was satisfactory.  Nonetheless, the specific form that the reforms have taken places 
them at odds with how the criminal law has historically attributed liability. It has been 
suggested that in recognition of this, the objective mens rea offence should be a separate 
offence, with a different maximum sentence. We shall assess the implications of accepting 
this route. Finally, we suggest that a negligent standard of sexual assault in the context of the 
criminal trial may in fact legitimise rather than attack pre-existing suppositions made by 
juries that the actions of a victim play a causative role in sexual assault. If this is the case, 
then the reforms have not achieved their aims of better substantive justice for victims. We 
shall discuss some of these concerns before turning our attention to our alternative model for 
addressing negligent sexual assault in tort law. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
3
 Dobinson and Townsley, above n 1, 159-65. 
4
 New South Wales, Second Reading Speech, Legislative Council, 7 November 2007, 3584 (John Hatzistergos, 
NSW Attorney-General and Minister for Justice). 
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A - An Objective Mens Rea 
  
The concept of an objective mens rea standard in the criminal law is controversial. This is 
despite the fact that examples of its existence are readily at hand: manslaughter by reason of 
criminal negligence or causing grievous bodily harm by negligent act, being just two 
examples. 
 
Traditionally, criminal culpability has been connected conceptually to the guilty mind of the 
defendant. Such a principle was as clear in Lord Coke’s 17th Century maxim actus no facit 
eum nisi mens sit rea – that is, an act does not make someone guilty unless their mind is also 
guilty – as it remained in the early 20th Century formulation proffered by C S Kenny that ‘no 
external conduct, however serious or even fatal its consequences may have been, is ever 
punished unless it is produced by some form of mens rea’.5 
 
One major justification for a focus on such subjectivism has been that the development of 
mens rea requirements in the criminal law was a civilising move away from an unjust focus 
on the actus reus alone that may have characterised criminal law systems of the past. In this 
way, for some, mens rea requirements play a significant role in contemporary justifications 
for criminal punishment, legitimising the intervention of the State into the lives of citizens.6 
 
Of course, this narrative of gradual if inevitable progress is overly simplistic. Defendants can 
be found guilty of a crime without knowledge of the content of the law, for example, as 
ignorance of the law is said never to excuse a defendant. Similarly, arguably, with late-
modernity has come the invention of new strict liability crimes, such as those relating to 
                                                                        
5
 C S Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (2nd Ed, 1904) 39. 
6
 See, for a fuller discussion of this historical aspect, Nicola Lacey, ‘Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal 
Law’ (2000) 9 Journal of Political Philosophy 249; George P Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (2000); David 
Cairns, Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial, 1800-1865 (1998); John H Langbein, The 
Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial (2003). 
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environmental pollution.7 And, of course, the mens rea requirement of recklessness includes 
situations where an accused did not even consider a particular risk at all.8 
 
Nevertheless, so-called ‘objective mens rea’ requirements do not sit well with this traditional 
focus on culpability through a guilty mind. Thus, the presumption remains that absent 
contrary statutory intent, a ‘mens rea, an evil intention, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness 
of the act, is an essential ingredient in every offence’.9 As Chief Justice Bray strongly argued 
in the context of criminal battery: 
“[i]t is contrary to fundamental principles and the whole tenor of modern thought to judge a 
man in a criminal court … not by his actual intention, knowledge or foresight, but by what a 
reasonable and prudent man would have intended, known or foreseen in the 
circumstances.”10 
 
Such distaste for objective tests may arise from the peculiar severity of the criminal 
jurisdiction. As the Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg, has argued: 
“The State can deliver no stronger condemnation than a finding of criminal guilt. Its reach 
can extend beyond the punishment itself - to loss of employment, or professional status, or 
even the freedom to travel abroad. These extra-judicial consequences record the social truth 
that, implicit in a criminal conviction, is the judgment that the defendant has done something 
reprehensible, warranting serious moral blame. Ultimately, it is the implicit moral 
condemnation in a conviction that gives the word ‘criminal’ its cultural resonance.”11  
 
                                                                        
7
 For example, Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW) s 116. 
8
 R v Kitchener (1993) 29 NSWLR 696; affirmed in Banditt v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 262. 
9
 Sherras v De Rutzen (1895) 1 QB 918, 921; affirmed in He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523. 
10
 MacPherson v Brown (1975) 12 SASR 184, 188 (Bray CJ). 
11
 The Right Honourable Lord Irvine of Lairg, Lard Chancellor, ‘Intention, Recklessness and Moral 
Blameworthiness: Reflections on the English and Australian Law of Criminal Culpability’ (2001) 23 Sydney 
Law Review 5, 6. 
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A major concern with the new amendments and notions of objective fault is that they fail to 
distinguish between people acting intentionally or recklessly and those that have merely taken 
less care than the reasonable person. There are clearly two different levels of moral 
culpability, but under the current law they are treated the same. 
 
The typical response of legislatures in creating offences with an objective mens rea has been 
to recognise a lower level of culpability through the provision of significantly lower 
maximum penalties. We shall consider the possibility of a separate offence of negligent 
sexual assault below. 
 
B - Two Levels of Culpability 
 
The taskforce briefly considered a suggestion to introduce a separate offence with a lower 
maximum penalty for sexual assaults in which the defendant had an honest but unreasonable 
belief the complainant was consenting. The suggestion was to include a s61IA: 
“Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person without the consent of the other 
person and who fails to take reasonable steps to ascertain whether the other person 
consented, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years.”12 
Among the benefits of this suggestion were to avoid the problem which arises under the 
current system, whereby the sentencing judge may be left unaware of the jury’s grounds for 
conviction (although to some extent the culpability of the accused could be taken into account 
on sentencing without having separate offences). In addition, other ramifications associated 
with the label of an offence may fail to take into account the lesser level of culpability, such 
as blacklisting through a criminal record and offender registries.13 
 
                                                                        
12
 Criminal Law Review Division, The Law of Consent and Sexual Assault, Discussion Paper (Attorney-
General’s Department NSW, 2007). 
 
13
 For a discussion on the effect of ‘labelling’ see, Thomas Crofts, ‘Two Degrees of Murder: Homicide Law 
Reform in England and Western Australia’ (2008) 8 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 187. 
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One concern with this suggestion has been that having separate offences may lead to 
compromised verdicts, as juries opt to take the lesser statutory offence. Surely though, this 
should not be a concern if we are to hold to a standard of proof that is beyond reasonable 
doubt. 
 
A more compelling objection to the introduction of a second offence involving a lower level 
of culpability lies in the highly political debate about the rights of complainants. It is difficult 
to imagine how a lawyer might justify to a complainant why the attack on them deserved a 
lesser penalty: is rape not just rape? To the layperson, by separating assailants into different 
levels of culpability, complainants may possibly feel that they are likewise being ranked. 
Evidence surrounding the complainant’s behaviour is likely to enter the court room, and the 
result might appear to be that some complainants had led their assailants on. Would the 
message be that some complainants are virtuous and have been raped, while others should 
exercise more responsibility for their actions? 
 
At a formal level, this objection rests on an inaccurate impression of criminal justice. Strictly 
speaking, the criminal law judges the actions and intentions of the accused, and makes no 
statement regarding the behaviour of the complainant. The verdict reveals that the defendant 
did not have reasonable grounds to believe the complainant was consenting. The trouble is, in 
the murkiness of a sexual assault trial, the practical effect might still be the separation of 
complainants into categories. These are only possibilities, and of course, arguments guessing 
public reaction and assumptions about lay opinions are weak. However, it warrants 
consideration whether the possible harm caused to complainants may not be commensurate 
with a more appropriate label for the defendant’s crime. 
 
This is an old issue arising from the conflict between lay perceptions of the criminal law, and 
what the law tells itself. It manifests in the politically charged question: to what extent are a 
complainant’s interests taken into account during the criminal justice process? Criminal 
justice has always erred on the side of the defendant. This is necessarily so, as a check on the 
courts’ power to deprive an accused of their liberty – they cannot lock away the complainant. 
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C - Reasonable grounds: The Victim on Trial? 
  
In either the legislation’s current form, or in a graduated liability structure, negligent sexual 
assault trials may have the opposite effect on a complainant’s experience of justice than that 
anticipated by the legislature. It may be that in its attempt to extend further protection to 
complainants of sexual assault, the legislature has inadvertently created a situation in which a 
complainant’s actions will become the primary focus of sexual assault trials.  
 
Where a defendant claims they believed a complainant was consenting to sex, the jury is 
required to have regard to ‘all the circumstances of the case’ in determining whether there 
were reasonable grounds for that belief. Naturally, the words and conduct of the complainant 
preceding sexual intercourse are likely to be included for examination. In addition, facts the 
defendant knew about the complainant and even things the defendant had heard about the 
complainant could be considered relevant to determining whether the defendant had 
reasonable grounds for their belief. 
 
At present, the extent to which the subjective features of the defendant may be taken into 
account in determining whether they had reasonable grounds is something that is yet to be 
determined.14 As a result, the exact evidence that may be taken into account in making the 
jury’s determination remains unclear, but enough is clear to show that the jury will be, to a 
large degree, passing judgment on the actions of the complainant as much as the actions of 
the defendant. 
 
Where a jury finds that a defendant’s belief that a complainant was consenting was 
reasonable, the jury will be in effect concluding that it was the actions of the complainant 
which brought about the sexual assault. Defence barristers, more than ever, will be 
encouraged by the law to argue that any reasonable person, faced with the actions of the 
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complainant and their history, would have concluded they were consenting. Trials turning on 
such archaic notions would be a travesty. It may be commented that at least in practical terms 
the position did not differ before the amendments. Nonetheless, the distinction after the 
reforms is that the law now actively encourages juries to engage in this form of reasoning, 
giving them a duty to consider ‘all the circumstances of the case’ in measuring the grounds 
for the defendant’s belief. The view that some victims may contribute to their sexual assault 
is now ingrained in the letter of the law. 
 
Yet in introducing the legislation, the Attorney-General John Hatzistergos stressed the 
difficulties that complainants already face with jurors who continue to hold ‘stereotypical 
beliefs about rape and its victims’. He cited a study by the Australian Institute of Criminology 
that revealed that ‘juror judgments in rape trials are influenced more by the attitudes, beliefs 
and biases about rape that jurors bring with them into the courtroom than by the objective 
facts presented’.  Some jurors, he continued, ‘still hold the view that women often say “no” 
when they mean “yes”, that women who are raped often ask for it, and that rape results from 
men not being able to control their need for sex and responsibility for rape is therefore 
removed’.15 It may be a cruel twist of irony that the government’s attempts to change juror 
attitudes in fact give their existing attitudes a more powerful role in resolving sexual assault 
trials. 
 
III - A Tort of Sexual Assault 
  
In cases of negligent sexual assault, reality becomes splintered. There are two alternative 
experiences of one event: for the defendant, it was consensual sex; while for the complainant, 
it was sexual assault. Unlike other legal disputes where one single factual account can be 
distilled and conflict arises over the application of legal principles, here the law is being 
asked to intervene in a space between subjective realities. The dispute sharply reveals the 
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 New South Wales, Second Reading Speech, Legislative Council, 7 November 2007, 3584 (John Hatzistergos, 
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potential inadequacy of a ‘rights’ based discourse.16 Both defendant and complainant could 
be said to have rights: collectively, victims’ rights or defendants’ rights; more specifically, 
the right to have one’s harm addressed by the law, conflicting with the right of an accused to 
be judged by their own guilty mind. The identification of rights in conflict arguably does little 
to promote solutions to harmonise those rights. 
  
The injustice of the law before the amendment was centred on the complainant’s unaddressed 
harm, not on any guilty mind of the criminal. To us, such a focus resembled the 
preoccupations of tort law more than those of criminal law. Could tort law be used to address 
the harm suffered by the complainant, without moving criminal law away from its traditional 
focus on a subjective guilty mind? What we propose is a tort of sexual assault: a civil penalty 
for negligent sexual assault. 
  
Apart from offering a more theoretically-accordant basis for remedies, a tort of sexual assault 
would have a number of key benefits for complainants. The tort would bolster the court’s 
public denouncement of the defendant’s actions. Defendants would face social consequences 
as their behaviour is publicised which, along with the pecuniary penalty, would generate 
public disapproval of the behaviour. In addition, and also in favour of complainants, the 
problem of conservative juries already discussed would be eradicated from tort cases. 
Hopefully, under the gaze of a judge, determinations would be made more objectively and 
free from such outdated conceptions. Similarly, complainants would avoid the difficulties of 
the very high standard of proof required in the criminal law, as their case would be subject 
instead to a ‘balance of probabilities’ standard applicable in the civil law. Where 
complainants lack corroborative evidence, it is practically difficult in criminal trials for 
prosecutors to establish the facts of their case beyond a reasonable doubt against the word of 
a defendant. A tort of sexual assault would alleviate this difficulty. 
 
                                                                        
16
  See also, Helen Irving, ‘Rights and Citizenship in Law and Public Discourse’ in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), Protecting Rights Without a Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance 
and Reform in Australia (2006) 161. 
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At least technically, liability in tort for sexual assault would not need to stem from the 
creation of any new, discrete tort. Plaintiffs might already bring a complaint of sexual assault 
through battery, or, as seen in some existing case law, in negligence. It is through these 
existing structures of tort law that we now turn to explore the tort of sexual assault. 
 
A - Battery 
 
Battery is the most attractive civil remedy available to a complainant of sexual assault as a 
result of the operation of onuses of proof. Battery is a trespass to the person whereby the 
defendant causes physical contact with the plaintiff. In Australia, a plaintiff must merely 
establish the fact that contact occurred for an action of battery to lie. 
 
In an action for battery in the civil law, consent is most likely a defence and must be proven 
by a defendant. This position is not uncontroversial in Australia. It has been argued that the 
absence of consent should be an element of battery,17 reflecting the position in England.18 
However, the issue seems settled in Australia since McHugh J’s strong statement in Marion’s 
Case that the onus of proving consent must fall to the defendant.19 Justice McHugh argued 
that to find otherwise would be to fail to adequately recognise individual autonomy and the 
right to have control over one’s body.20 This reasoning is clearly applicable in the context of 
sexual assault. 
 
Accordingly, a defendant in action for battery arising out of sexual assault would have the 
onus of proving that their sexual partner consented to the sexual intercourse on the balance of 
                                                                        
17
 Rosalie Balkin and Jim Davis, Law of Torts (3rd Ed, 2004) 39; Sam Blay ‘Onus of Proof of Consent in an 
Action for Trespass to the Person’ (1987) 61 Australian Law Journal 25. 
18
 Freeman v Home Office (No 2) [1983] 3 All ER 589, 594-5. 
19
 Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion's Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218, 310-
11 (McHugh J). 
20
 Ibid. 
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probabilities.21 In contrast, consent is part of the actus reus under the criminal law and must 
be established by the prosecution. The change in the onus and burden of proof would be a 
procedural advantage to complainants under tort law. 
 
B - Negligence 
 
Under the current law of negligence, the plaintiff would need to establish a duty of care, 
breach of that duty and damage caused by the breach that is not too remote. It is still unclear 
in Australia whether acts amounting to intentional trespass can be pleaded as negligence. In 
sexual assault cases, the sex act is usually intentional, though the defendant may have been 
careless in ascertaining consent. The High Court has said in obiter that if the actions of a 
defendant were intentional, then the claim must be brought in trespass and not negligence.22 
However, this was not followed by the Tasmanian Supreme Court in Wilson v Horne, where 
the plaintiff was allowed to sue in negligence for sexual assault.23 However, Wilson v Horne 
involved resurfaced memories of sexual abuse as a minor, which presented a different 
situation as consent was not an issue. 
 
The law of negligence would need to be adapted to incorporate notions of consent for a tort 
of negligent sexual assault. People would owe a duty of care to ensure consent before 
engaging in sexual intercourse. This duty would be breached if the defendant had no 
reasonable grounds to believe the plaintiff was consenting. Causation of damage and 
remoteness could then follow the general law, being physical or psychological harm.24 Such a 
tort would mirror s61HA(3)(c) of the Crimes Act. 
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 Ibid. 
22
 Williams v Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465, 473. 
23
 Graeme James Gregory Wilson v Cherie Jayne Horne [1999] TASSC 33 (‘Wilson v Horne’). Leave to appeal 
this decision was rejected: Wilson v Horne (1999) 19 Leg Rep SL4a. 
24
 Wilson v Horne [1999] TASSC 33. 
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For the reasons discussed above, a plaintiff might not recover under a tort of negligent sexual 
assault for intentional sexual assaults, and besides, the label of negligent sexual assault would 
be inappropriate. Without fundamental changes, negligence does not seem to be the right 
model on which to base a tort of sexual assault. While it seems apt to bring an action 
involving an objective standard in negligence, the language of consent is unfamiliar to 
negligence, while it is a defence to battery. The emphasis in battery is placed upon the 
disregard of human dignity, while negligence is more concerned with assessing the harm 
caused. 
 
The tort of battery also has advantages in terms of the amount of damages recoverable by a 
plaintiff. The most obvious limitation on damages in negligence, the Civil Liability Act, does 
not apply to ‘sexual misconduct’.25 Nevertheless, battery is actionable without any proof of 
damage.26 Under negligence, there might be difficulty establishing a recognised psychiatric 
illness.27 Aggravated damages may be awarded depending on the defendant’s conduct, but 
exemplary damages are only likely to be awarded where the sexual assault was intentional.28 
 
C - Problems with a Tort of Sexual Assault 
  
There are major concerns with a tort claim for sexual assault. Perhaps most obviously is the 
extent to which damages might appropriately remedy the harm suffered in a sexual assault. 
This issue has both a philosophical and practical dimension. First, money may be seen as a 
vastly inadequate response to the non-financial damage occasioned by sexual assault. 
Secondly, though, damages in tort are always first and foremost limited by the capacity of the 
tortfeasor to pay. Where tortfeasors are unable to pay, plaintiffs would be left with a claim 
against the victim’s compensation fund.29 Further, the plaintiff plays a greater role in tort 
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 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 3B. 
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 Battiato v Lagana [1992] 2 Qd R 234. 
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 Wilson v Horne (1999) 8 Tas R 363. 
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 Lamb v Contogno (1987) 164 CLR 1. 
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 Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW) sch 1, pt 6. 
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claims, and in the case of negligence, this might further expose them to defences such as 
contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk. This would only place more 
emphasis upon the complainant’s actions during trial, which risks replicating the problems 
currently experienced by sexual assault complainants. Last, the problems mentioned above 
that arise in the context of having two separate levels of liability (here, a criminal sanction 
and, alternatively, liability in tort) apply. It is possible that the existence of liability in tort, 
but not in criminal law, would ostensibly separate complainants into classes more or less 
responsible for their own harm. 
 
The last issue will necessarily arise wherever the law attempts to protect both victim and 
accused in an uneasy legal compromise. The most that can be said in this regard is that the 
distinction between tort and criminal liability is perhaps the most appropriate line to draw to 
strike a balance between the rights of the victim and those of the accused. In the context of a 
criminal trial, the right of an accused to a fair trial is unchallengeable. The harm caused by a 
wrongful conviction prevents any true consideration of a victim’s rights. The civil law is 
better able to juggle the competing rights of the victim and accused, as the defendant’s liberty 
is not at stake. 
IV - Conclusions 
  
The issue of consent in the law of sexual assault highlights fundamental conflicts about who 
the criminal law should ultimately protect. The law as it stood before the introduction of 
s61HA led to injustice for some complainants of sexual assault; it did not recognise their 
‘right’ to see their assailant punished. However, the legislature’s solution in s61HA conflicts 
with historical and theoretical tenets of the criminal law regarding the culpability of accused 
persons. The criminal law has traditionally placed a greater emphasis upon the accused’s 
right to be judged according to their subjectively guilty mind. 
 
The insertion of an objective mens rea into sexual assault also fails to reflect different levels 
of moral culpability for negligent versus intentional or reckless sexual assault. A graded set 
of sexual assault offences would more appropriately match the crime to the level of moral 
 Public Space: The Journal of Law and Social Justice (2009) Vol 4, pp 105-121 
culpability and is more in line with other negligent mens rea offences. Yet, such a set of 
offences may have the undesired effect of grading complainants.30 We have argued that this 
unfortunate outcome stems from attempts to utilise the criminal law to redress victims’ harm, 
disregarding the important fact that the criminal law has traditionally focused on the 
culpability of the accused, not the harm caused to the victim. 
 
We have raised the possibility of a separate tort of sexual assault that is more in line with 
traditional notions of criminal law yet still protects the complainant’s rights. Tort liability for 
sexual assault is possible under existing tort law and offers a range of benefits for 
complainants, including with regards to the burden and onus of proof, as well as the problems 
currently experienced by victims when faced with conservative juries. However, tort 
remedies rely on there being a solvent offender to sue, may implicate complainants in counter 
claims and may similarly grade victims. While a tort of sexual assault is an unlikely 
contender for reform, it is nevertheless always useful to be reminded of the alternatives that 
lie beyond the boundaries of the criminal law and which may be more theoretically consistent 
in achieving the aims of policymakers.  By focusing all of their efforts on reforming the 
criminal law in attempting to find justice for victims, legislators may have settled on a 
‘solution’ that does not respect traditional legal distinctions and therefore will never satisfy 
all stakeholders.  
                                                                        
30
 As to graded levels of rape, see discussion of ‘real rape’ in, for example, Lois Pineau, ‘Date Rape: A Feminist 
Analysis’ in Leslie Francis (ed), Date Rape: Feminism Philosophy, and the Law (1996) 1. 
